Hunt v. Hunt

Source: Vermont Justice

HUNT_V_HUNT.93-424; 162 Vt. 423; 648 A.2d 843

[Opinion Filed August 5, 1994]

 Filed 05-Aug-1994

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.

                                 No. 93-424

 Linda Lee Hunt                               Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Essex Family Court

 Eugene Earl Hunt                             December Term, 1993

 Alan W. Cook, J.

 Jeffrey L. Martin, Waterbury, for appellee Office of Child Support, Agency
   of Human Services

 Jean A. Swantko, Island Pond, for defendant-appellant

 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.

      ALLEN, C.J.   Defendant Eugene Hunt was found in contempt of court for
 failure to comply with an order to pay child support.  He appeals both the
 finding of contempt and the underlying support order, alleging that their
 imposition violates his right to free exercise of religion, as guaranteed by
 the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and Chapter I, Article
 3 of the Vermont Constitution.  We affirm the order of support, but vacate
 the judgment of contempt.
      Defendant belongs to the Northeast Kingdom Community Church in Island
 Pond.  In keeping with their faith in an "everlasting covenant" with God,
 described in Christian scriptures, members of the Church lead an ascetic,
 communal existence.  Members eschew all personal possessions and work for

 the benefit of the community, often in one of the various Church-run
 business enterprises that offer goods to the public and provide income to
 the Church.  A recognized nonprofit corporation, the Church pays taxes and
 meets all other obligations to the State.  Defendant files tax returns
 reporting dividend income from the Church, but has no access to the funds
 themselves, which apparently are retained in the Church treasury.  In
 return, the Church provides for each member's housing and living
 necessities.  The Church does not believe in no-fault divorce, and forbids a
 member to support an estranged spouse or children who live outside the
 community.
      Defendant has been a member of the Church for the past fourteen years.
 Except for a brief period, defendant and his family lived in the Church
 community at Island Pond.  Plaintiff left the community with their children
 sometime in 1989, but defendant remained.  Plaintiff began receiving Aid to
 Needy Families with Children (ANFC) benefits, and assigned all rights of
 child support to the Vermont Department of Social Welfare.  Defendant
 refused to enter into a voluntary agreement to make periodic support
 payments in an amount satisfactory to the Commissioner of Social Welfare.
 Defendant maintained, and has continued to maintain, that he cannot sanction
 his wife's choice to leave him without just cause in the eyes of the Church,
 and therefore cannot support his children outside the community.  Further,
 defendant contends that because he himself owns nothing and cannot,
 consistent with his faith, work outside the community, he cannot earn money
 to meet a support obligation.  Nevertheless, he expresses concern for his
 children and his desire to care for them, which he asserts is possible only

 if they reside in the community with him.  He has provided the children with
 shoes from the community cobbler shop where he works.
      In early 1990, the Department of Social Welfare sought an order fixing
 a monthly child support payment amount and appropriate arrearages.  A
 hearing was held before the Human Services Officer, at which defendant
 represented himself.  On April 18, 1990, the Human Services Officer ordered
 defendant to pay fifty dollars per month for the support of his children,
 and to pay past amounts due for ANFC benefits already received.(FN1)
      Plaintiff filed for divorce in August 1990, and the Office of Child
 Support (OCS) intervened on the issue of child support.  Defendant appeared
 and testified at the hearings, but did not contest the divorce.  In the
 final decree, plaintiff was given full parental rights and responsibilities
 for the minor children.  On July 3, 1991, the family court, which assumed
 the former appellate jurisdiction of the Human Services Board, "affirmed"
 the decision of the Human Services Officer.  The court ordered a fifty-
 dollar-per-month child support obligation, and liability for amounts past
 due.  After nearly a year with no payments, OCS filed a petition in August
 1992 to find defendant in contempt of the family court's order.  On April
 20, 1993, at a conference before the family court concerning the contempt
 petition, defendant contended that he never had a proper opportunity to
 appeal the Human Service Officer's finding that he had the ability to make
 child support payments.  The family court granted defendant a de novo

 hearing on the issue of his ability to pay child support, as part of the
 hearing on the OCS contempt petition.
      At the contempt hearing, the court took testimony from plaintiff,
 defendant, and an official of the Church.  The court found, as the Human
 Services Officer had, that defendant has a ninth-grade education and no
 physical or mental infirmities that would prevent him from earning enough to
 meet the monthly support obligation.  The court acknowledged defendant's
 claim that the Church does not sanction no-fault divorce and that working
 outside the community would constitute a breach of faith, and found that his
 beliefs were sincerely held.  The court further found that defendant had
 given up all his worldly possessions.  For the purposes of its analysis, the
 trial court accepted "at full face value" the proposition that defendant's
 faith does not permit church members to earn an independent income.
 Nevertheless, the court concluded that defendant is an otherwise able-
 bodied individual, whose claim of incapacity arises from a conscious,
 controllable choice to adhere to certain religious tenets.  Therefore, the
 court concluded, defendant has the ability to pay child support as "a matter
 of law."  It also noted that "[m]atters of religious belief, as a matter of
 law, do not furnish an exemption from that ability [to pay]."
      The court went on to find that the monthly support and arrearages were
 valid and enforceable obligations, and that defendant had the present
 ability to comply with the order.  Defendant was held in contempt for his
 willful failure to comply with the order.  On September 9, 1993, defendant
 was committed to the custody of the Commissioner of Corrections pending
 payment of $640, approximately one-quarter of his total obligation as of
 April 30, 1993.  Defendant was released pending this appeal.

      Defendant makes two interrelated claims, alleging violations of his
 right to free exercise of religion under the United States and Vermont
 constitutions.  First, he contends that the support order is invalid because
 the hearing officer and the family court erred in finding that he has the
 ability to pay child support in any amount whatsoever.  Second, defendant
 contends that the family court should have considered alternatives to
 contempt and incarceration to enforce the support order.
                                     I.
      We begin with defendant's claim regarding the validity of the support
 order itself.
                                     A.
      The State of Vermont recognizes the general duty of child support on
 the part of a parent:  "The legislature . . . finds and declares as public
 policy that parents have the responsibility to provide child support."  15
 V.S.A. { 650.  To promote this policy, the family court must order "either
 or both parents . . . to pay an amount for the support of the child," id.
 { 658(a), which is allocated between the parents in proportion to their
 respective incomes, id. { 656(a).  However, in the case of the noncustodial
 parent, the family court may depart from the presumed total support
 obligation, as determined under the support guideline adopted under { 654.
         If the noncustodial parent's gross income is less than
         the lowest income figure in the support guideline . . .
         or is less than the self-support reserve, the court
         shall use its discretion to determine support using the
         factors in section 659 of this title and shall require
         payment of a nominal support amount.
 Id. { 656(b) (emphasis added).  This Court has noted in construing these
 provisions that "it is clear that the Legislature . . . intended to require

 at least a nominal child support award in all cases."  Viskup v. Viskup, 150
 Vt. 208, 210, 552 A.2d 400, 402 (1988).
      In determining defendant's support obligation, the hearing officer
 calculated a monthly gross income of $480 in accordance with the relevant
 guidelines of 15 V.S.A. { 653(5):
    "Gross income" means actual gross income of a parent.
           Gross income shall include:
                                      . . .
              (B)  expense reimbursements or in-kind payments
           received by a parent in the course of employment or
           self-employment or operation of a business if they
           reduce personal living expenses;
              (C)  in its discretion, the court may consider as
           gross income the difference between the amount a parent
           is earning and the amount a parent has earned in cases
           where the parent voluntarily becomes unemployed or
           underemployed, unless the parent is physically or
           mentally incapacitated.
 15 V.S.A. { 653(5)(B), (C) (1989).(FN2)  Of the $480, $180 was attributed to
 { 653(5)(B) in-kind payments, which must be included in gross income.  The
 hearing officer exercised discretion under { 653(5)(C) to include the
 remaining $300 that defendant "could be receiving either through wages,
 worker's compensation or disability payments."
      Defendant contends that imputing the $300 as gross income was an abuse
 of discretion, because his religious beliefs, not personal choice, bar him
 from accepting state benefits or wages from employment outside the
 community.  Had this amount not been included, however, the mandatory
 inclusion of in-kind payments still would have resulted in a monthly gross
 income, for purposes of { 653, of $180.  Since the hearing officer
 determined that the $480 monthly income amount was less than the self-

 support reserve defendant was entitled to under { 653(7), an income of $180
 would also fall below this minimum maintenance level.  In either case,
 defendant has a gross income greater than zero but less than the self-
 support reserve, which requires the court to exercise discretion,
 considering the factors of { 659, in figuring a monthly support obligation.
 See 15 V.S.A. { 656(b).  Therefore, if the hearing officer erred in not
 exercising discretion to exclude the income described in { 653(C), the error
 is harmless.
      Defendant also asserts that { 659 may be construed to exempt him from
 the legal obligation to support his children.  When defendant's child
 support obligation was first computed, { 659(a) read, in relevant part:
            The total support obligation shall be presumed to be
         the amount of child support needed.  If the court finds
         that a child support order based on the support
         guidelines would be inequitable, the court shall
         establish support after considering all relevant
         factors, including but not limited to:

              (1)  the guidelines for child support established
           under section 654 of this title;
              (2)  the financial resources of the child;
              (3)  the financial resources of the custodial parent;
              (4)  the standard of living the child would have
           enjoyed had the marital relationship not been
           discontinued;
              (5)  the physical and emotional condition of the
           child;
              (6)  the educational needs of the child;
              (7)  the financial resources and needs of the
           noncustodial parent; and
              (8)  inflation with relation to the cost of living.
      15 V.S.A. { 659(a) (1989) (emphasis added).(FN3)

      Defendant argues that the language "all relevant factors, including but
 not limited to," permits consideration of his ability to provide support in
 light of his religious beliefs, and gives the family court discretionary
 powers to relieve him of any support responsibility.  We agree that the
 plain language of the statute ensures flexibility in situations in which a
 parent cannot meet the support amount suggested in the child support
 guideline, and that the non-exclusive list of relevant factors would not
 rule out consideration of religious beliefs in fixing the support amount.
 Nevertheless, the plain language of the statutory scheme mandates at least a
 nominal payment, notwithstanding the court's conclusions drawn from evidence
 regarding the ability to meet a regular support obligation.  See 15 V.S.A.
 { 656(b).
      Defendant does not contest the amount of the support award, but the
 fact that any payment at all was ordered.  As a matter of fairness, the
 family court may depart from the presumed child support obligation in cases
 of hardship, but the Legislature has clearly required that SOME payment must

 be made.  Cf. Ainsworth v. Ainsworth, 154 Vt. 103, 109-12, 574 A.2d 772,
 775-78 (1990) (court has narrow discretion under { 659 to depart from
 guideline presumption).  We cannot agree with defendant that the family
 court has the discretion not to order any support obligation if, as in this
 case, the parent has gross income as defined in { 653.  Therefore, the order
 must stand unless it impermissibly infringes upon defendant's constitutional
 right to free exercise of religion.
                                     B.
      The First Amendment to the United States Constitution mandates that
 "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
 prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . ."  U.S. Const. amend. I.  This
 provision binds the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
 Amendment.  Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).  The Free
 Exercise Clause precludes all "governmental regulation of beliefs as such."
 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963).  Government may, however,
 under certain circumstances, impinge on an individual's actions in accor-
 dance with those beliefs in exercising the power to prescribe or proscribe
 conduct.  See, e.g., Employment Div., Dep't of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990) (members of Native American Religion who smoked peyote
 as part of ritual ceremony not exempt from general criminal ban on the
 substance); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982) (Amish employer
 must pay Social Security taxes despite religious prohibition against
 participation in governmental support programs); Reynolds v. United States,
 98 U.S. 145, 166-67 (1878) (no exemption for adherents of Mormon faith from
 laws prohibiting polygamy).

      Before Smith, no clear standard existed for determining whether
 governmental interference with free exercise was legitimate.  See Smith, 494 U.S.  at 876-89 (discussing inconsistent use of strict scrutiny standard
 promulgated in Sherbert v. Verner and other approaches to free exercise
 cases); cf. Note, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An
 Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1407 (1992) (agreeing that no
 standard consistently employed, but differing with some of Smith's
 conclusions).  The Supreme Court attempted to forge a uniform standard in
 Smith, holding "that a law that is neutral and of general applicability need
 not be justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has
 the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious practice."  Church
 of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 113 S. Ct. 2217, 2226
 (1993).
      In response to Smith's "virtual elimination" of the mandate that
 government justify burdening religious practice through neutral laws, the
 United States Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of
 1993, P.L. 103-141, 107 Stat. 1488 (codified at 5 U.S.C. { 504; 42 U.S.C.
 {{ 1988, 2000bb, 2000bb-1 to -4), explicitly overruling Smith.  The Act's
 stated purpose is "to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in
 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
 (1972) and to guarantee its application in all cases where free exercise of
 religion is substantially burdened."  42 U.S.C { 2000bb(b)(1).  The Act
 provides that government "shall not substantially burden a person's
 exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
 applicability," unless the government demonstrates that burdening the person
 (1) furthers a compelling governmental interest, and (2) advances that

 interest in the least restrictive means possible.  Id. { 2000bb-1(a),(b).
 In short, the Act demands that all governmental action that substantially
 interferes with the free exercise of religion be justified under a
 traditional strict scrutiny analysis.(FN4)
      The fact that the Act was passed in November 1993, after the entry of
 the support and contempt orders at issue, does not prevent its application
 in this case.(FN5)  Section 6, entitled "Applicability," states that the Act
 "applies to all Federal and State law, and the implementation of that law,
 whether statutory or otherwise, and whether adopted before or after the
 enactment of th[e] Act."  Id. { 2000bb-3(a) (emphasis added).  The statutory
 language evinces clear congressional intent that the law apply retroactive-
 ly.  Thus, we conclude that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act controls
 our analysis of defendant's free exercise claim under the federal constitu-
 tion.  See Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 837
 (1990) (act must be retroactively applied if congressional intent clear).
      To assess the validity of the child support order, we must first make
 the threshold determination of whether it substantially burdens defendant's
 sincerely held beliefs.  If so, we proceed to scrutinize the nature of the

 State's interest and the means used to further that interest.  Defendant
 must show the burden on his religious practice.  Abington Sch. Dist. v.
 Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963).  The State has the burden of proving its
 actions are the least restrictive means of advancing a compelling interest.
 42 U.S.C. {{ 2000bb-1(b), 2000bb-2(3).
      At the contempt hearing, in which the court considered de novo the
 question of ability to pay, defendant produced uncontested evidence of the
 nature of his religious beliefs and life in the community.  We emphasize
 that matters of faith "need not be acceptable, logical, consistent, or
 comprehensible to others in order to merit First Amendment protection."
 Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 714 (1981).  It
 follows that the court must accept at face value the asserted impact of
 government action on an individual's free exercise of religion, provided the
 beliefs are sincerely held.  Lee, 455 U.S.  at 257.  In this case, the trial
 court found that defendant is sincere in his religious devotion.  The court
 acknowledged defendant's claim that he cannot support his wife and family in
 their lives outside the community, and that seeking employment outside the
 community to meet a support obligation would be completely contrary to his
 faith.
      Nevertheless, the court concluded that a support obligation would
 burden defendant only incidentally.  Neither the evidence offered nor the
 court's findings, however, support this conclusion.  See V.R.C.P. 52(a);
 Nickerson v. Nickerson, 158 Vt. 85, 88-89, 605 A.2d 1331, 1333 (1992)
 ("Findings of fact, from which conclusions of law flow, will not be set
 aside unless clearly erroneous.").  A state-imposed obligation that
 indirectly compels defendant to risk significant penalties if he chooses to

 adhere to his faith creates a substantial free exercise burden.  Cf. Yoder,
 406 U.S.  at 218 (impact of compulsory school attendance law on Amish
 religion "severe and inescapable" because of threat of criminal sanction).
 In this case, to conclude otherwise unjustly denigrates the importance of
 defendant's religious beliefs.
      We proceed to consider the nature of the State's interest and the means
 used to advance that interest.  Unquestionably, the State has a significant
 interest in promoting the health and welfare of children, which includes
 ensuring that parents who have separated bear responsibility for support.
 See 15 V.S.A. { 650.  The support obligation seeks to provide the children
 with stability by maintaining their accustomed standard of living, and to
 lessen the drain on public resources caused by public assistance programs.
 As a matter of social policy, the support obligation also fosters respon-
 sibility in parents for their children.  We conclude that parental support
 of children is a compelling state interest.
      The child support order is valid if the order to pay support is the
 least restrictive means to further the state interest.  42 U.S.C. { 2000bb-
 1(b)(2).  The evidence is undisputed that the State requested that defendant
 voluntarily assume his portion of the total support responsibility, and that
 defendant refused for the same religious reasons he contends render him
 unable to meet any payment obligations.  Leaving aside the question of
 arrearages, defendant's lack of custody of his son (FN6) prevents defendant 
 from providing for him in the future in accordance with the tenets of his 
 faith. 

 Vermont has no other established means for the State to require
 parents to meet their support obligations.  Lacking any other practical
 means to impose the support obligation, a court order is the least
 restrictive means to establish such an obligation to further the State's
 interest in child support. 
      We conclude, then, that the order was legitimately imposed, despite the
 fact that it burdens defendant's free exercise of religion by saddling him
 with a legally enforceable obligation to support his children outside of
 marriage and the Church community.  The order represents the least re-
 strictive means for the State to further a paramount interest in having
 parents recognize their obligation to provide material support for their
 children.  Therefore, the order does not offend defendant's right to free
 exercise under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
                                     C.
      This does not end our scrutiny of the order, however, because defendant
 also claims that its imposition violates his rights under Chapter I, Article
 3 of the Vermont Constitution.  In relevant part, Article 3 establishes:
           That all men have a natural and unalienable right, to
         worship Almighty God, according to the dictates of their
         own consciences and understandings, as in their opinion
         shall be regulated by the word of God; . . . and that no
         authority can, or ought to be vested in, or assumed by,
         any power whatever, that shall in any case interfere
         with, or in any manner control the rights of conscience,
         in the free exercise of religious worship.
 Vt. Const., ch. I, art. 3.  We bear in mind that First Amendment restric-
 tions on the State preclude a construction of Article 3 that would afford an
 individual less protection of the right to free exercise of religion than
 that guaranteed under the federal constitution.  See In re E.T.C., 141 Vt.
 375, 378, 449 A.2d 937, 939 (1982).  Of course, the state constitution may

 afford greater protections to this right.  See State v. Badger, 141 Vt. 430,
 449, 450 A.2d 336, 347 (1982).  But in light of the Religious Freedom
 Restoration Act, greater protection under the state charter would require
 even greater obstacles to state action than those raised by the strict
 scrutiny test.
      Though this court has had few opportunities to construe the Article 3
 guarantee, we find one of the more recent cases, State v. DeLaBruere, 154
 Vt. 237, 577 A.2d 254 (1990), particularly instructive for its comprehensive
 analysis of Vermont's free exercise provision.  DeLaBruere concerned a free
 exercise challenge under the state and federal constitutions to the State's
 compulsory education law.  The defendants had supported their claim for
 greater state constitutional protection with a variety of interpretational
 approaches:  historical analysis, examination of the text, other states'
 interpretations of similar provisions in their own constitutions, and
 sociological materials.  Id. at 262-63, 577 A.2d  at 268.  We concluded "that
 at least with respect to the claims made in this case, we can find no basis
 for the argument that the Vermont Constitution affords additional
 protection to defendants."  Id. at 265, 577 A.2d  at 270.  Though DeLaBruere
 was decided before the promulgation of the Religious Freedom Restoration
 Act, this conclusion endures, because the First Amendment analysis in that
 case essentially duplicates the strict scrutiny standard now mandated under
 the Act for free exercise claims.  See id. at 249, 577 A.2d  at 261.
      Based on DeLaBruere, we see no principled basis to say that the
 Vermont Constitution offers greater protection for a free exercise claim
 such as defendant's than the strict scrutiny standard at issue.  An
 examination of the relevant case law revealed Article 3 to be more an anti-

 discrimination provision, adopted by a people whose "'militant sense of
 freedom . . . was somewhat reserved in expression of religious liberty.'"
 Id. at 264, 577 A.2d  at 269 (quoting Swart v. South Burlington Town Sch.
 Dist., 122 Vt. 177, 182, 167 A.2d 514, 517, cert. denied, 366 U.S. 925
 (1961)).  In addition, an examination of relevant decisions from other
 states' constructions of their own free exercise provisions revealed that,
 almost without exception, none offered more protection to religious practice
 than that required by strict scrutiny.  See id. at 266-69, 577 A.2d at 270-
 72.
      Defendant fails to offer, and we have not discovered, reason to
 construe Article 3 to provide any greater protection than that afforded by
 strict scrutiny.  See Varnum v. Varnum, 155 Vt. 376, 381-87, 586 A.2d 1107,
 1110-13 (1990) (post-DeLaBruere case with no analysis, separate and distinct
 from First Amendment, of Article 3 claim that family court violated mother's
 free exercise rights by factoring religious beliefs and practices into child
 custody determination).  As evidence that Article 3 guarantees greater
 deference to religious liberty, defendant points to Beauregard v. City of
 St. Albans, in which this Court found "mere interference" with free exercise
 sufficient to invalidate a will provision that restricted the religious
 affiliation of members of a public school board.  141 Vt. 624, 632, 450 A.2d 1148, 1152 (1982).  But in DeLaBruere we scrutinized Beauregard and
 concluded that despite its broad pronouncement, the decision lacked real
 analysis and "fell squarely within the anti-discrimination construction of
 Article 3."  DeLaBruere, 154 Vt. at 265, 577 A.2d  at 270.
      Therefore, in the context of a free exercise challenge founded on an
 order to pay child support, we hold that Chapter I, Article 3 of the Vermont

 Constitution protects religious liberty to the same extent that the
 Religious Freedom Restoration Act restricts governmental interference with
 free exercise under the United States Constitution.  As a result, the court
 order to pay child support, valid under the First Amendment, also withstands
 scrutiny under the Vermont Constitution.
                                     II.
      In contrast to the support order, the contempt order does not stand up
 to scrutiny under either the federal or state constitution, because the
 order has not been shown to be the least restrictive means of furthering the
 State's interest in parents supporting their children.
                                     A.
      Under 15 V.S.A. { 603, "[a] person who disobeys a lawful order or
 decree of a court or judge . . . may be proceeded against for contempt."
 Upon determining that the subject of a valid, enforceable order is capable
 of complying but refuses to do so, the family court may exercise its
 discretion to impose sanctions for contempt.  See Andrews v. Andrews, 134
 Vt. 47, 49, 349 A.2d 239, 241 (1975).  In cases of noncompliance due to a
 claimed financial inability, the court must find a present ability to pay
 before the defendant may be found in contempt.  Steele v. Steele, 142 Vt.
 112, 114, 453 A.2d 400, 401 (1982).  Ordinarily, use of the contempt power
 is subject to review only for an abuse of discretion.  Brown v. Brown, 140
 Vt. 56, 58, 435 A.2d 949, 951 (1981).
      In this case, defendant contends he failed to comply with the support
 order because of financial inability -- that his religious beliefs preclude
 him from personal ownership of property or employment outside the community.
 As part of the contempt proceeding, the trial court conducted a de novo

 hearing on defendant's ability to meet the child support obligation, both
 at the time of the contempt hearing and at the time the original support
 order was entered.  Conceding the sincerity of defendant's religious
 beliefs, the court found that nothing other than those beliefs prevented him
 from earning enough, either at the time the order was originally imposed or
 at the time of the contempt hearing, to meet a support obligation.
 Concluding that defendant, capable of compliance, had willfully failed to
 comply with a valid court order, the court found him in contempt and ordered
 incarceration.
      Defendant contends that the contempt order and subsequent incarceration
 violated his free exercise rights.  To assess the merit of his claim under
 the First Amendment, we again employ the framework of the Religious Freedom
 Restoration Act:  the State may substantially burden defendant's religious
 liberty only after demonstrating that its actions with regard to defendant
 are the least restrictive means of advancing a compelling state interest.
 42 U.S.C. { 2000bb-1(b).
      The argument regarding enforcement differs from that regarding
 imposition of the original support obligation.  Defendant's objection to the
 support obligation, which is distinct from how that obligation is enforced,
 proceeds from the Church's proscription of no-fault divorce.  There is no
 evidence that the obligation per se offends any other tenet of his faith.
 The State's manner of enforcement, however, compelled defendant to choose
 between jail time and violation of another religious belief:  that he not
 earn an independent income outside the Church community.  Either option
 would result in defendant's separation from the community.  Therefore, the

 order and possibility of incarceration substantially burdened defendant's
 free exercise of religion.
      Enforcement of child support orders furthers the same policies promoted
 by imposition of the original obligation.  As noted above, the State has a
 compelling interest in securing support for children from parents no longer
 sharing the same household.  Contempt and incarceration represent means of
 furthering that interest, but the Religious Freedom Restoration Act puts the
 burden upon the State to show that they are the means least restrictive of
 defendant's religious freedom.
      In the contempt hearing, the State offered no evidence that it was
 pursuing the least restrictive alternative.  Essentially, the State sought a
 harsh sanction in a case of imputed income.  At oral argument before this
 Court, counsel for OCS acknowledged that his office exercises considerable
 discretion in pursuing delinquent obligors.  OCS generally follows up on
 cases with a "reasonable possibility" of successful collection -- generally,
 not delinquent obligors without assets or employment.  The State has failed
 to establish that contempt and jail are the least restrictive means to
 further the State's compelling interest in enforcing the child support
 obligation.  Contempt and incarceration are not, per se, impermissible
 infringements on free exercise, and may be imposed provided the State makes
 the requisite showing as mandated by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
 In this case, however, the State has failed to make this showing, and
 therefore the contempt order impermissibly burdens defendant's free exercise
 rights as guaranteed by the federal constitution.

                                    III.

      In summary, we hold that the child support order, though a substantial
 burden on defendant's rights to free exercise of religion under the United
 States and Vermont constitutions, is the least restrictive means of
 furthering a compelling governmental interest.  The contempt order, however,
 must be vacated because the State has not demonstrated that contempt and
 incarceration are the means to enforce the support order least restrictive
 of defendant's free exercise rights under the United States Constitution.
      The order of the Human Services Officer imposing a monthly support
 obligation and requiring payment of arrearages is affirmed.  The order of
 the family court finding defendant in contempt is vacated and the matter is
 remanded for a hearing as to the least restrictive means to enforce
 defendant's support obligation.

                                    FOR THE COURT:

                                    _____________________________
                                    Chief Justice

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                              Footnotes

FN1.    In May 1990, defendant filed a notice of appeal from the hearing
 officer's decision with the Human Services Board, but no further action was
 taken because plaintiff had filed for divorce.  In the interim, the Board
 was divested of jurisdiction in support cases.  See 4 V.S.A. { 454(1)
 (family court has exclusive jurisdiction over support proceedings for all
 cases filed or pending on or after October 1, 1990).

FN2.    Section 653(5) was substantially amended, effective October 1, 1990.

FN3.    Section 659(a) was amended, effective October 1, 1990:
          The total support obligation shall be presumed to be the
     amount of child support needed.  Upon request of a party, the
     court shall consider the following factors in respect to both
     parents.  If, after consideration of these factors, the court
     finds that application of the guidelines is unfair to the child
     or to any of the parties, the court may adjust the amount of child
     support:
          (1)  The financial resources of the child.
          (2)  The financial resources of the custodial parent.
          (3)  The standard of living the child would have enjoyed had
     the marital relationship not been discontinued.
          (4)  The physical and emotional condition of the child.
          (5)  The educational needs of the child.
          (6)  The financial resources and needs of the noncustodial
     parent.
          (7)  Inflation.
          (8)  The costs of meeting the educational needs of either
     parent, if the costs are incurred for the purpose of increasing
     the earning capacity of the parent.
          (9)  Extraordinary travel expenses incurred in exercising
     the right to periods of visitation or parent-child contact.
          (10) Any other factors the court finds relevant.

FN4.     In overruling Smith and re-establishing the strict scrutiny
 standard as the touchstone for permissible governmental interference with
 free exercise rights, Congress has construed the Free Exercise Clause of the
 United States Constitution.  Thus, though a federal law guides our
 analysis, because the Act defines the meaning of the federal constitution
 our resolution of this case rests on a constitutional as well as statutory
 basis.  We express no opinion on the constitutionality of the Act.

FN5.    The effect of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act was not
 addressed in the briefs, because it became law after they were submitted to
 this Court.  The parties were given the opportunity to review their
 positions in light of its requirements.  Defendant agrees with the
 retroactive applicability of the Act; the State contends, contrary to our
 conclusion, that the Act may be applied only prospectively.

FN6.    Of the three children, only the youngest is still a minor.  The
 court may not order support payments after a child has attained the age of
 majority or has terminated secondary education, whichever is later.  15
 V.S.A. { 658(c).

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                       Concurring and Dissenting

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.

                                 No. 93-424

 Linda Lee Hunt                               Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Essex Family Court

 Eugene Earl Hunt                             December Term, 1993

 Alan W. Cook, J.

 Jeffrey L. Martin, Office of Child Support, Waterbury, for plaintiff-
   appellee

 Jean A. Swantko, Island Pond, for defendant-appellant

 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.

      MORSE, J., concurring and dissenting.   In my view this case does not
 necessarily present a clash between the free exercise of defendant's
 religion and a child's right to support.  I would therefore reverse on a
 narrower ground and not remand.
      Defendant's inability to pay child support is no different had he
 worked for any employer who for any reason paid compensation other than with
 money.  I agree with the dissent of Justice Dooley that "[i]n an economic
 sense, the church is defendant's employer" and that the burden should be on
 the State to collect child support in cases like this from the custodian of
 the money held for defendant's benefit.  I believe the State could proceed
 directly against the church under garnishment, given the broad definition of
 "wages" in 15 V.S.A. { 780(9), or trustee process.  The sanction of impris-

 onment for contempt is the most drastic remedy and its imposition is an
 abuse of discretion if alternative effective remedies are reasonably avail-
 able.  See Spallone v. United States, 493 U.S. 265, 276 (1990) (in
 selecting civil contempt sanctions, court must use least possible power to
 achieve desired end).  The challenge based on free exercise of religion is
 premature at this point.
      I would reverse the order of contempt, which would leave the state free
 to pursue, if it wishes, alternative remedies.

                                         __________________________________
                                         James L. Morse, Associate Justice

-------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                               Dissenting

 NOTICE:  This opinion is subject to motions for reargument under V.R.A.P. 40
 as well as formal revision before publication in the Vermont Reports.
 Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Vermont Supreme
 Court, 109 State Street, Montpelier, Vermont 05609-0801 of any errors in
 order that corrections may be made before this opinion goes to press.

                                 No. 93-424

 Linda Lee Hunt                               Supreme Court

                                              On Appeal from
      v.                                      Essex Family Court

 Eugene Earl Hunt                             December Term, 1993

 Alan W. Cook, J.

 Jeffrey L. Martin, Waterbury, for appellee Office of Child Support, Agency
   of Human Services

 Jean A. Swantko, Island Pond, for defendant-appellant

 PRESENT:  Allen, C.J., Gibson, Dooley, Morse and Johnson, JJ.

      DOOLEY, J., dissenting.   I do not believe that the order to pay child
 support in this case can stand consistent with the First Amendment as
 interpreted by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993.  Two factors
 are critical to my view.
      First, the real source of the controversy is the communal living
 arrangement required by the Northeast Kingdom Community Church.  Defendant
 works as a cobbler and salesman in the church cobbler shop.  All income from
 his work effort goes directly to the church and, in turn, all of his needs
 are met by the church.  Defendant has no individual income or assets.  This
 communal living arrangement is commanded by church doctrine; defendant

 cannot be a church member without residing in the church community and
 participating in its economy.
      Second, the issue is whether defendant can be required to pay a nominal
 amount of child support even though the guideline calculation would
 otherwise exempt him.  Under our guideline system, an obligor spouse is
 assigned a "self-support reserve," which is "an amount sufficient to
 provide a reasonable subsistence compatible with decency and health."  15
 V.S.A. { 653(7).  The point of the self-support reserve is that it
 represents an income floor beneath which the obligor should not be taken in
 order to pay child support.  Thus, when the obligor's income is above the
 self-support reserve, but a support order calculated under the guidelines
 would leave the obligor with income below the self-support reserve, the
 support amount is presumed to be the difference between the obligor's income
 and the self-support reserve.  See id. { 656(c).  This rule leaves the
 obligor the amount of the reserve to meet his or her own needs.  When the
 obligor's income starts out below the self-support reserve, the policy is
 essentially the same except that the court must "require payment of a
 nominal support amount."  Id. { 656(b).
      Although the requirement of at least a nominal payment is
 understandable, it has the perverse effect of leaving the lowest income
 obligor with a smaller income than that retained by an obligor with an
 income slightly above the guidelines.  In this case, it also creates a
 constitutional conflict.  Defendant has no cash income, so he is well below
 the self-support reserve.  The trial courts imputed income to defendant
 because he has the employment history and current skills that would allow
 him to work and support his children outside the church.  They also noted

 that defendant's individual income tax returns reflected income of $2,300
 per year, which represented that portion of total church income assigned by
 the church to defendant.  Even after income imputation, however, defendant's
 income falls below the self-support reserve.
      As the majority recognizes, the purpose of the Religious Freedom
 Restoration Act was to restore the compelling interest test as set forth in
 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214 (1972).  Sherbert noted that "a rational relationship to some
 colorable state interest" is insufficient; instead, "'[o]nly the gravest
 abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible
 limitation.'"  Sherbert, 374 U.S.  at 406 (quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945)).  Yoder explained that "only those interests of the
 highest order and those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate
 claims to the free exercise of religion."  Yoder, 406 U.S.  at 215.
      I emphatically agree with the majority about the importance of child
 support obligations and requiring that parents honor them. Therefore, I
 would ordinarily find that child support laws further a compelling
 governmental interest.  In this case, however, we have a clash of principles
 with virtually no economic or social substance.  The sole policy in issue
 requires every parent with a child support obligation, no matter how low his
 or her income, to pay at least a small amount of child support to maintain
 that sense of obligation.  I support that policy, but I can not accept that
 it involves a "paramount" state interest or an "interest "of the highest
 order."  The very nature of First Amendment balancing requires us to be
 discerning about the interests involved and the methods employed.  See
 Yoder, 406 U.S.  at 221 (when Amish refused to send children to public school

 beyond the eighth grade, Court could not accept "sweeping claim" of
 compelling interest in compulsory education; Court must "searchingly
 examine" state interest in policy in dispute).  The symbolism of a
 "nominal" child support order does not rise to the level of state interest
 necessary to substantially burden a parent's free exercise of religion.
      In evaluating the state interest involved here, it is instructive how
 the issue of nominal payment is handled in the federal child support
 enforcement scheme and in the other states, which like Vermont have adopted
 child support guidelines.  Pursuant to the Family Support Act of 1988,
 states are required to adopt child support guidelines and adopt a rebuttable
 presumption that in each individual case the amount of child support ordered
 will be based on the guidelines.  See 42 U.S.C. { 667 (1988); 45 C.F.R. {
 302.56 (1993).  There is no requirement in federal law that courts order at
 least a nominal amount of support in every case, no matter how low the
 income and resources of the obligor parent.  Although I do not have an exact
 count, the reported decisions suggest that unlike Vermont, most states do
 not require very low income obligors to pay child support.  See Hannah v.
 Hannah, 582 So. 2d 1125, 1126 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991) (when noncustodial
 parent has no ability to pay, it is improper to order parent to pay child
 support); Schneider v. Schneider, 473 N.W.2d 329, 332 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)
 (absent finding of bad faith, trial court cannot order child support
 against parent unable to pay because of unemployment); State ex rel. Wilcox
 v. Strand, 442 N.W.2d 256, 258 (S.D. 1989) (upholding refusal of trial court
 to order child support against parent because of parent's limited ability to
 pay); Glenn v. Glenn, 848 P.2d 819, 822 (Wyo. 1993) (incarcerated parent
 without income or assets not subject to child support order).  The different

 attitudes on obtaining support orders in every case is demonstrated by
 Wilcox, in which an attempt by the state to obtain an order against a parent
 because she was capable of working but was voluntarily unemployed brought a
 hostile reaction from the court: "[t]he burden on the judicial caseload
 enhanced by this sort of action and appeal is not appreciated."  Wilcox, 442 N.W.2d  at 258.
      Although the parties have not raised this point, there is a serious
 question whether Vermont's requirement for a support order from every non-
 custodial parent is consistent with the federal requirement that guidelines
 take into consideration the income of the absent parent and operate as
 rebuttable presumptions.  See 42 U.S.C. { 667(b)(2).  The issue was
 litigated in New York, which by statute requires an award of at least $25
 per month per child, and the New York Court of Appeals struck down the
 nominal amount requirement as inconsistent with federal law.  See Rose v.
 Moody, 629 N.E.2d 378, 381, 607 N.Y.S.2d 906, 909 (N.Y. 1993), cert. denied,
 114 S. Ct. 1837 (1994).  The Court reasoned, "For a judicial decree to
 declare that [the parent] . . . owes what she cannot realistically or
 legally pay is not only unjust and inappropriate, it is a legal pretense."
 Id.  Thus, the nominal-amount provision violated the federal requirement
 that the obligor be able to rebut the guideline amount when he or she can
 show that application of the guidelines would be "unjust or inappropriate"
 in a particular case.  Id.
      I think it ironic that a policy the New York Court of Appeals found not
 to be legally sustainable is found by this Court to involve a compelling
 state interest that overrides a claim of religious liberty.  Whether the New
 York Court is right or wrong, it is clear that we can reach the majority's

 result only by accepting that virtually any state interest is sufficient to
 trump a religious liberty claim under the Sherbert and Yoder decisions.  The
 Religious Freedom Restoration Act plainly demands more than this lip-service
 tribute to the free exercise of religion.
      Even if I agreed that a child support order in this case advanced a
 compelling state interest, I cannot agree that it advances the "interest in
 the least restrictive means possible."  Whatever income is earned from
 defendant's labor is retained by the church.  In an economic sense, the
 church is defendant's employer.  By requiring wage withholding in most child
 support cases involving employed obligors, 15 V.S.A. { 781(a), the State has
 found that employers have an obligation to help create a workable system of
 child support enforcement.  I see no reason why the State could not
 legislate that the income that flows to the church from defendant's labor is
 encumbered by defendant's obligation of support.  Thus, the payment
 obligation would be placed on the church, which has the income and assets
 from which collection is achievable.  This obligation is no different from
 those placed on the church by taxation or Social Security laws with which it
 must comply.  See, e.g., Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization,
 493 U.S. 378, 392 (1990).
      Although the majority is remanding to determine whether there is a less
 alternative than contempt, there is no indication of an alternative under
 present law.  Thus, it is highly likely, if not inevitable, that we will
 again imprison defendant in an attempt to make him pay what he does not
 have.  The real dispute here is between the State and the church, and I do
 not believe that we are justified in holding a church member hostage to
 this dispute.  If the State is correct that its interests are so fundamental

 that they must be enforced in these circumstances, this Court should insist
 that they be enforced directly against the church that retains the income in
 issue.
      For the above reasons I would hold that the nominal support payment
 order can not be enforced against defendant consistent with his right to
 free exercise of religion.  I dissent.

                                    _____________________________
                                    Associate Justice